Mercurial > hg > CbC > CbC_gcc
annotate gcc/config/host-linux.c @ 88:f214c1d5b862
merge 89
author | Nobuyasu Oshiro <dimolto@cr.ie.u-ryukyu.ac.jp> |
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date | Tue, 20 Dec 2011 18:53:46 +0900 |
parents | f6334be47118 |
children | 04ced10e8804 |
rev | line source |
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0 | 1 /* Linux host-specific hook definitions. |
67
f6334be47118
update gcc from gcc-4.6-20100522 to gcc-4.6-20110318
nobuyasu <dimolto@cr.ie.u-ryukyu.ac.jp>
parents:
0
diff
changeset
|
2 Copyright (C) 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2010 Free Software Foundation, Inc. |
0 | 3 |
4 This file is part of GCC. | |
5 | |
6 GCC is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it | |
7 under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published | |
8 by the Free Software Foundation; either version 3, or (at your | |
9 option) any later version. | |
10 | |
11 GCC is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT | |
12 ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY | |
13 or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public | |
14 License for more details. | |
15 | |
16 You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
17 along with GCC; see the file COPYING3. If not see | |
18 <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ | |
19 | |
20 #include "config.h" | |
21 #include "system.h" | |
22 #include "coretypes.h" | |
23 #include "hosthooks.h" | |
24 #include "hosthooks-def.h" | |
25 | |
26 | |
27 /* Linux has a feature called exec-shield-randomize that perturbs the | |
28 address of non-fixed mapped segments by a (relatively) small amount. | |
29 The feature is intended to make it harder to attack the system with | |
30 buffer overflow attacks, since every invocation of a program will | |
31 have its libraries and data segments at slightly different addresses. | |
32 | |
33 This feature causes us problems with PCH because it makes it that | |
34 much harder to acquire a stable location at which to map our PCH | |
35 data file. | |
36 | |
37 [ The feature causes other points of non-determinism within the | |
38 compiler as well, so we'd *really* like to be able to have the | |
39 driver disable exec-shield-randomize for the process group, but | |
40 that isn't possible at present. ] | |
41 | |
42 We're going to try several things: | |
43 | |
44 * Select an architecture specific address as "likely" and see | |
45 if that's free. For our 64-bit hosts, we can easily choose | |
46 an address in Never Never Land. | |
47 | |
48 * If exec-shield-randomize is disabled, then just use the | |
49 address chosen by mmap in step one. | |
50 | |
51 * If exec-shield-randomize is enabled, then temporarily allocate | |
52 32M of memory as a buffer, then allocate PCH memory, then | |
53 free the buffer. The theory here is that the perturbation is | |
54 no more than 16M, and so by allocating our buffer larger than | |
55 that we make it considerably more likely that the address will | |
56 be free when we want to load the data back. | |
57 */ | |
58 | |
59 #undef HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_GET_ADDRESS | |
60 #define HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_GET_ADDRESS linux_gt_pch_get_address | |
61 | |
62 #undef HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_USE_ADDRESS | |
63 #define HOST_HOOKS_GT_PCH_USE_ADDRESS linux_gt_pch_use_address | |
64 | |
65 /* For various ports, try to guess a fixed spot in the vm space | |
66 that's probably free. */ | |
67 #if defined(__alpha) | |
68 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x10000000000 | |
69 #elif defined(__ia64) | |
70 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x2000000100000000 | |
71 #elif defined(__x86_64) | |
72 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x1000000000 | |
73 #elif defined(__i386) | |
74 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000 | |
75 #elif defined(__powerpc__) | |
76 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000 | |
77 #elif defined(__s390x__) | |
78 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x8000000000 | |
79 #elif defined(__s390__) | |
80 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000 | |
81 #elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__LP64__) | |
82 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x8000000000 | |
83 #elif defined(__sparc__) | |
84 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x60000000 | |
85 #elif defined(__mc68000__) | |
86 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0x40000000 | |
87 #else | |
88 # define TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE 0 | |
89 #endif | |
90 | |
91 /* Determine a location where we might be able to reliably allocate SIZE | |
92 bytes. FD is the PCH file, though we should return with the file | |
93 unmapped. */ | |
94 | |
95 static void * | |
96 linux_gt_pch_get_address (size_t size, int fd) | |
97 { | |
98 size_t buffer_size = 32 * 1024 * 1024; | |
99 void *addr, *buffer; | |
100 FILE *f; | |
101 bool randomize_on; | |
102 | |
103 addr = mmap ((void *)TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, | |
104 MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); | |
105 | |
106 /* If we failed the map, that means there's *no* free space. */ | |
107 if (addr == (void *) MAP_FAILED) | |
108 return NULL; | |
109 /* Unmap the area before returning. */ | |
110 munmap (addr, size); | |
111 | |
112 /* If we got the exact area we requested, then that's great. */ | |
113 if (TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE && addr == (void *) TRY_EMPTY_VM_SPACE) | |
114 return addr; | |
115 | |
116 /* If we didn't, then we need to look to see if virtual address | |
117 randomization is on. That is recorded in | |
118 kernel.randomize_va_space. An older implementation used | |
119 kernel.exec-shield-randomize. */ | |
120 f = fopen ("/proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space", "r"); | |
121 if (f == NULL) | |
122 f = fopen ("/proc/sys/kernel/exec-shield-randomize", "r"); | |
123 randomize_on = false; | |
124 if (f != NULL) | |
125 { | |
126 char buf[100]; | |
127 size_t c; | |
128 | |
129 c = fread (buf, 1, sizeof buf - 1, f); | |
130 if (c > 0) | |
131 { | |
132 buf[c] = '\0'; | |
133 randomize_on = (atoi (buf) > 0); | |
134 } | |
135 fclose (f); | |
136 } | |
137 | |
138 /* If it isn't, then accept the address that mmap selected as fine. */ | |
139 if (!randomize_on) | |
140 return addr; | |
141 | |
142 /* Otherwise, we need to try again with buffer space. */ | |
143 buffer = mmap (0, buffer_size, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0); | |
144 addr = mmap (0, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0); | |
145 if (buffer != (void *) MAP_FAILED) | |
146 munmap (buffer, buffer_size); | |
147 if (addr == (void *) MAP_FAILED) | |
148 return NULL; | |
149 munmap (addr, size); | |
150 | |
151 return addr; | |
152 } | |
153 | |
154 /* Map SIZE bytes of FD+OFFSET at BASE. Return 1 if we succeeded at | |
155 mapping the data at BASE, -1 if we couldn't. | |
156 | |
157 It's not possibly to reliably mmap a file using MAP_PRIVATE to | |
158 a specific START address on either hpux or linux. First we see | |
159 if mmap with MAP_PRIVATE works. If it does, we are off to the | |
160 races. If it doesn't, we try an anonymous private mmap since the | |
161 kernel is more likely to honor the BASE address in anonymous maps. | |
162 We then copy the data to the anonymous private map. This assumes | |
163 of course that we don't need to change the data in the PCH file | |
164 after it is created. | |
165 | |
166 This approach obviously causes a performance penalty but there is | |
167 little else we can do given the current PCH implementation. */ | |
168 | |
169 static int | |
170 linux_gt_pch_use_address (void *base, size_t size, int fd, size_t offset) | |
171 { | |
172 void *addr; | |
173 | |
174 /* We're called with size == 0 if we're not planning to load a PCH | |
175 file at all. This allows the hook to free any static space that | |
176 we might have allocated at link time. */ | |
177 if (size == 0) | |
178 return -1; | |
179 | |
180 /* Try to map the file with MAP_PRIVATE. */ | |
181 addr = mmap (base, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, offset); | |
182 | |
183 if (addr == base) | |
184 return 1; | |
185 | |
186 if (addr != (void *) MAP_FAILED) | |
187 munmap (addr, size); | |
188 | |
189 /* Try to make an anonymous private mmap at the desired location. */ | |
190 addr = mmap (base, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, | |
191 MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); | |
192 | |
193 if (addr != base) | |
194 { | |
195 if (addr != (void *) MAP_FAILED) | |
196 munmap (addr, size); | |
197 return -1; | |
198 } | |
199 | |
200 if (lseek (fd, offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) | |
201 return -1; | |
202 | |
203 while (size) | |
204 { | |
205 ssize_t nbytes; | |
206 | |
207 nbytes = read (fd, base, MIN (size, SSIZE_MAX)); | |
208 if (nbytes <= 0) | |
209 return -1; | |
210 base = (char *) base + nbytes; | |
211 size -= nbytes; | |
212 } | |
213 | |
214 return 1; | |
215 } | |
216 | |
217 | |
218 const struct host_hooks host_hooks = HOST_HOOKS_INITIALIZER; |